Uneven Development and Irish Peripheralisation. by Breathnach, Proinnsias
the term Ireland refers to the island 
prosperity between the Republic of 
mber st<ltes is more extreme than is 
tree other peripheral regions (Spain, 
)fwhom have improved 'Purchasing 
• an average of 14.1 per cent during 
ter performance of these other areas 
' much lower purchasing power base. 
refers to those unemployed for 12 
rention in Ireland is very high in 
md main competitor states. In 1993 
quivalent of 9.1 per cent of GNP on 
EU average of 3.1 per cent (Shirlow, 
ost-industrial flexibility has focused 
tt relations. Two forms of flexibility 
flexibility deals specifically with the 
I the capacity of a firm to adjust the 
)ductive and technical workers in 
I technology alterations. Numerical 
•ability of a firm to alter employment 
rrergence of such distinct forms of 
~d to new production techniques and 
~ntred upon core and peripheral 
1 
Uneven Development and Irish 
Peripheralisation 
PRIONNSIAS BREATHNACH 
l!:cland - both North and South - is commonly perceived and 
portrayed as constitutip,g a peripheral region, or more accurately 
two peripheral regions, Within a European context. A Synthetic 
Index of regional indicators (based on productivity and unem-
ployment) compiled by the EC in 1984 placed Northern Ireland 
second-last and the Republic of Ireland fourth-last of 131 Level 
II EC regions. The respective index values as a proportion of the 
EC average were, 35 per cent for Northern ]relarid and 42 per cent 
for the Republic of Ireland. For Hamburg, the region with the 
highest index, the respective proportions were 23 per cent and 
27 per cent (Trimble, 1990). A more sophisticated index published 
in 1987 showed the Republic's, and more particularly Northern 
Ireland's, relative position to have improved significantly, but this 
was mainly due to the effect of EC enlargement. Both parts of 
Ireland were still more than one .standard deviation worse than 
the EC average, and were the only EC regions outside the Mediter-
ranean area in this category. Iu;land's economic peripherality is 
commonly seen as ~1, i.e. Ireland is located 
on the margins of a European economy in which economic 
prosperity and dynamism are strongly concentrated in a core 
region frequently referred to as the 'Golden Triangle'. Economic 
opportunity is seen as being a function of accessibility to the 
external economies offered by this core region (Keeble et a!., 
1982). From this point of view, therefore, geographically peripheral 
regions such as Ireland face severe disadvantages which account, 
in large part, for their poor comparative economic performance. 
This chapter reviews some conflicting views on how the problem 
of peripherality should be tackled from an economic policy point 
of view, with respect specifically to the Republic of Ireland. The 
conventional economic emphasis on cost minimisation as the key 
to international competitiveness is dismissed as an inadequate 
response to the developmental needs of the Irish economy. The 
need to create integrated export-oriented industrial sectors is 
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advanced, but the steps required to achieve this are considered 
to be beyond the conceptual grasp of the Irish economics 'estab-
lishment'. The findings of an inquiry into why Ireland has failed 
to create such a structure, where other small European countries 
have succeeded, are examined. Some ideas on how this deficiency 
in the Irish economy can be tackled are then presented. Initially, 
however, the chapter provides a historical backdrop to the current 
economic situation in Ireland, both North and South. 
Peripheral Ireland 
The modern similarity between the economic structures of 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland hides the fact that, 
until relatively recently, there were profound differences between 
them (Walsh, 1979). In the nineteenth century, the Belfast region 
in particular experienced a form of industrialisation quite similar 
to that of many other British regions at the time of the Industrial 
Revolution. This involved the creation of a specialis~nd 
.integrated export-oriented economie-€E>Jllf>lex_bl,l~he 
linen, engineering and shlplmildiug.industrig_s (O'Malley, 1989). 
By contrast, the remainder of the island actually experienced a 
.process of deindustrialisation in the early nineteeHth century, due 
mainly to the introduction off.ree trade with Britain following 
the 1800 Act of Union, and the c;.rnll:alisatinn-<:>U:h@-linen.inill!sJ:ry 
jn fu:lfqs,t. As a consequence, the economy of the South was 
~!most entirely dependent on the l.illlll.ll..C.tion and ~EJQ!!.()f_agr_i­
c-~altmaLprodu!:l!_to._fuL!h:i_\iSlLmMKet. The resultant lack of 
diversification and widespread poverty generated a continuous 
stream of ~migrants, mainly to Britain and the USA. By 1921, the 
population of the island had been reduced to almost one half of 
the 1841level (Kennedy eta!., 1988). At the time of partition and 
the establishment of the Irish Free State (subsequently to become 
the Republic oflreland), only ten per cent of the South's workforce 
were engaged in manufacturing industry (compared with over one 
third in the North), while over one half were engaged in agriculture 
(Walsh, 1979). 
The twentieth century witnessed the N~'T's industri3l base txp~­
riencing growing difficulties, due mam y to_s.~alisation in 
industries which have been in secular decline throughout the UK. 
Thus, the shipbuilding industry is now but a shadow of its former 
self, while the linen industry has been all but obliterated. 
Government attempts in the 1960s to replace these declining 
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industries with imported synthetic fibre plants met with consid-
erable initial success, but ultimately foundered when this sector 
also experienced structural decline in the 1970s. Meanwhile the 
pglitical troubles have severely constrained the ability to attract 
other forms of outside investment. In the South, a uolicy of 
d$veloping a manufacturing base through providing protection 
fQr infant industries serving the domestic market met with con-
sjQ!:r_abl€0 initial success. However, the small size of the Irish 
market placed limits on long-term growth potential, and the 
inability to expand into export markets inevitably led to eventual 
stagnation in the 1950s. With the agricultural sector experienc-
ing rapid contraction, this meant unprecedented emigration rates 
and major overall population decline. 
The resultant crisis forced a reversal of economic policy and a 
switch to export-oriented industrial growth based on the attraction 
of foreign investment. This policy worked quite well in the 1960s 
and 1970s, although the employment gains in the foreign sector 
were counteracted to a considerable extent by contraction of 
indigenous industry, especially following EC entry in 1973 and 
the consequent exposure of Irish industry to external competition. 
In the 1980s there was an overall fallback in manufacturing 
employment, although O\ltput continued to expand strongly . 
This pointed to basic weaknesses in the prevailing industrial 
policy, particularly its emphasis on low-skill assembly work which 
has proved to be vulnerable to automation, and the failure of 
foreign branch plants to generate a significant degree of local 
linkage (Breathnach, 1988). Consequently, the 1980s saw both a 
build-up of unemployment and a resumption of mass emigration 
from the Republic of Ireland. 
The net effect of these trends has been to create economic 
structures in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland 
which are remarkably similar. In both economies the manufac-
turing sector is now dominated by overseas firms, which account 
for about 40 per cent of employment and a higher proportion of 
output in both cases (Hamilton, 1993). Further, the foreign sector 
consists of limited-skill branch plants with few local linkages 
(Borooah, 1993; Telesis Consultancy Group, 1982). This, in turn, 
is related to high levels of unemployment, typically in the 15-20 
per cent range in both parts of the island in the late 1980s (despite 
on-going net emigration from the two areas). While the tertiary 
sector now dominates the employment structure of both 
economies, its growth has fallen short of that required to reduce 
unemployment rates to EU levels. 
18 Developmentlreland 
Overcoming Peripherallty: 
The Conventional View 
The conventional economist's typical prescription for dealing 
with the problem of Irish peripheralisation is to minimise transport 
and production costs for Irish-based producers.1 The Irish 
government has responded to this prescription in part by allocating 
a high proportion (over one quarter for the period 1989-93) of 
EC structural funding to the improvement of transport infra-
structure. Regarding production costs, these are generally equated 
by conventional economists with labour costs. This is not entirely 
unreasonable since, although the share of wages in total manu-
facturing input costs has been declining, wages remain the largest 
single element of these costs on average for all industries (Storper 
and Walker, 1989). However, to argue, as most conventional 
economists do, that the minimisation of labour costs is the key 
to international competitiveness is another matter. Thus, in his 
regular Saturday column in the Irish Times (June 5, 1993), Garret 
Fitzgerald, formerly an academic economist (and, of course, also 
a former Irish Prime Minister) argued that the fundamental cause 
of Ireland's current high level of unemployment was excessive 
wage levels. Virtually simultaneously, Kieran Kennedy, the 
influential director of the state-sponsored Economic and Social 
Research Institute, was arguing much the same thing in the June 
1993 issue of the Irish Banking Review (Kennedy, 1993a). 
The fact is that labour costs in Irish manufacturing industry are 
already much lower than those of Ireland's main trading partners 
and have been falling quite significantly in relative terms; by over 
one third in the 1980s (Economic Review and Outlook: various 
years). Yet this has had no apparent bearing on Irish manufac-
turing employment which declined overall by eight per cent in 
the 1980s. One may contrast Fitzgerald's one-dimensional view 
of the Irish employment problem with an international survey 
reported in the Irish Times (July 9, 1993) which compared 38 
countries with respect to 37 different criteria for competitiveness. 
While Ireland performed best regarding unit labour costs in man-
ufacturing industry, it was placed only thirteenth in terms of overall 
competitiveness. It is clear that there is a lot more to national 
economic performance than simple labour costs. 
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Non-conventional Alternatives 
It is evident that the conventional neoclassical emphasis on the 
minimisation of production and transport costs as the key to success 
in international markets is of little relevance to the search for 
possible future routes for Irish economic development policy. Over 
ten years ago the Telesis Report on Irish industrial policy pointed 
to three broad industrial sectors which could potentially be used 
as a base for Irish industrial development (Telesis Consultancy 
Group, 1982). These included, first, activities in which low labour 
costs could offer competitive advantage; second, activities based 
on natural resources in which Ireland possesses, or could achieve, 
comparative advantage; and third, what Telesis called 'complex-
factor-cost' industries, or what would nowadays be called 
'high-tech' industries, in which the key to competitive advantage 
is technological organisation or marketing know-how. 
Telesis went on to dismiss the first of these: Irish wage levels 
are already such that Ireland could never conceivably compete 
with those Third World countries which do actively compete in 
these industries and where wage costs are extremely low compared 
with Ireland. As regards high-tech industries, studies show that 
for these, neither labour nor transport costs are necessarily 
significant factors in market success. Thus, in a survey of American 
high-tech firms operating in the west European market, Schoen-
berger (1990) found product quality and support service to be 
frequently more important than price as factors influencing 
potential customers. More specifically, Schoenberger noted that, 
for most of the firms surveyed, the decision on whether or not 
to locate a production plant in Europe was not influenced by the 
cost of exporting to Europe from a US base, since 'transportation 
costs to Western Europe are not considered a significant barrier 
to competitiveness' (1990, p. 384). Of course, Ireland already 
exports very large volumes of high-tech products to continental 
Europe, and these exports have been growing consistently and 
rapidly over the last twenty years (Foley, 1991). The problem, as 
noted earlier, has been that Ireland's strong performance as an 
industrial producer and exporter has not been translating into spin-
off jobs elsewhere in the economy. The reasons for this are by now 
well known. The burgeoning Irish industrial export sector is 
dominated by foreign firms which have very limited local linkages, 
mainly because they import the great bulk of their technology, 
!.! 
i!i 
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goods and services, export almost all of their input, and repatriate 
most of their profits (Breathnach, 1988). As a result, the foreign 
firm sector does not act as an effective national 'economic base', 
in that strong export revenues have created very weak spin-offs 
in the form of residentiary (i.e. non-exporting) industries in the 
ancillary and consumer sectors (Malecki, 1991). 
The problem for Ireland, therefore, is to create a vibrant industrial 
sector based on indigenous industries sourcing material and 
service inputs within the Irish economy and capable of penetrating 
export markets (a similar prescription for Northern Ireland has 
been put forward in Borooah, 1993). As the possibility of developing 
an indigenous export base, relying on sectors in which labour costs 
are a key competitive factor, has already been ruled out, the only 
other options are to be found in the natural resource or modern 
technological sectors. The question is: how does one go about 
creating such industries? 
The Non-contribution of Irish 
Economists 
There is little evidence that conventional neoclassical economists 
can be of much assistance in answering this question. This is 
because of their very limited range of vision. As Lee has observed, 
among the Irish economics profession (which is almost entirely 
neoclassical in orientation), 'The premium is on tunnel thinking, 
blind to either long-term perspective or lateral linkage' (1989, p. 
583). This tunnel thinking is partly reflected in the aforementioned 
preoccupation with cost minimisation. It is further reflected in a 
concentration on the behaviour of the individual (whether the 
individual consumer or the individual firm) as the key to under-
standing the functioning of the economy. As Griffin and Gurley 
observe: 
No historian, sociologist, political scientist or anthropologist 
would systematically ignore all the social formations larger 
than the nuclear household ... conventional economists ... 
are alone in trying to understand human phenomena in terms 
of the behaviour of isolated households. (1985: p. 120) 
Conventional economists therefore tend to have little grasp of 
the broad social structures which constrain and shape the behaviour 
of individual economic factors. Twenty years ago, Myrdal (1973) 
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criticised economists for playing down such 'non-economic' 
factors as power relations, social and economic stratification, and 
institutions (such as religion, culture, law and politics) which act 
as strong impediments to economic development in under-
developed countries. This criticism can equally be applied to Irish 
economists today. We may add that conventional economists have 
even less grasp of the historical processes which produce these 
social structures, a direct consequence of what Lee (1989) sees as 
their fixation with inlmediate problems and short-term movements 
and their resultant limited understanding of long-term 
development processes. 
A final factor contributing to the tunnel vision characteristic 
of Irish economists is their tendency to confine themselves to 
economic models d'erived exclusively from the British and 
American experiences. This is to a certain extent understand-
able, given the reliance of Irish economists on English-language 
literature and the fact that many of them have done at least part 
of their training in Britain or the US. However, this has at least 
two negative consequences. First, it means that most Irish 
economists have little knowledge of the economic experiences of 
other countries, both developed and underdeveloped, and of 
alternative models deriving from these experiences. Second, both 
the British and American economies developed in circumstances 
which are quite different from those which pertained in Ireland. 
Accordingly, development models deriving from the British and 
American experience are quite inappropriate to the Irish situation. 
Despite this, Irish economists tend not to look beyond the British 
and American economic paradigms, which lead them to recom-
mending prescriptive measures which are at odds with the real 
development needs of the Irish economy. Moreover, economists 
of conventional neoclassical orientation account for close on 
100 per cent of the personnel in Irish university economics 
departments and in the research institutions and Consultancy firms. 
In effect neoclassical economists inevitably exert a powerful 
influence in government circles and, as a consequence, policy 
makers do not become aware of alternative development options. 
The Comparative European 
Perspective 
Despite these layers of blinkers which festoon the Irish economics 
establishment, a definite beam of light was allowed to penetrate 
22 Development Ireland 
recently in the form of a study commissioned by the National 
Economic and Social Council with the aim of identifying why a 
number of other European small open economies have achieved 
so much more economic success than Ireland. Mjoset's (1992) study 
was refreshing in his socio-historical analysis which transcended 
the simple macroeconomic analysis of contemporary macroeco-
nomic indicators. Mjoset's basic finding was that the countries 
selected for comparative purposes (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, 
Austria and Switzerland) had all managed to achieve what Amin 
(1974) defines as 'autocentric' development. This refers to a form 
of development whose driving force emanates from within the 
national economies in question, and includes a combination of 
import-substituting and export-oriented industrialisation. These 
forms of industrialisation have the effect of generating extensive 
domestic linkages, leading to the formation of what Mjoset terms 
'development blocks' (also referred to by Porter (1990) as 'clusters'), 
that is, interlinked networks of producers of materials and services 
in particular sectors. The extensive multipliers generated by this 
form of development lead to the creation of mass employment, 
low levels of unemployment and high living standards for the 
majority of the population. Thus what is produced is a virtuous 
circle of self-expanding economic growth and development, 
described by Myrdal (195 7) as a process of 'cumulative causation'. 
Ireland, by contrast, is characterised by what Amin terms 
'extraverted' or 'peripheral' development. This describes a situation 
where the essential structures of a national economy are determined 
by external forces, and usually include a high level of dependence 
on exports of unprocessed primary products and imports of man-
ufactured goods, and/or a high level of external ownership of 
domestic productive assets. Such an economic structure creates 
very limited local linkages and multiplier effects and low levels 
of employment creation. These in turn imply marginalisation of 
a large proportion of the population among whom very low 
living standards are the norm. 
Delndustrlallsatlon, Marglnallsatlon 
and Emigration 
Mjoset attributes Ireland's extraverted form of development to the 
deindustrialisation which affected most of Ireland (apart from the 
northeast) in the early nineteenth century. For Mjoset, the single 
most important consequence of this process of deindustrialisa-
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tion and associated marginalisation was the generation of a long-
lasting tradition of emigration which is still with us today. In this, 
Ireland was virtually unique among countries with extraverted 
economies, due essentially to the propinquity to two of the most 
rapidly expanding economies of the nineteenth century, Great 
Britain and the US. Although this has allowed the residual 
population to enjoy a standard of living which is unusual amo~g 
extraverted economies, it has stripped Ireland of the dynamiC 
impulses which characterise autocentric forms of development. 
Mjoset concurs with the view that emigration selectively removes 
potential innovators and entrepreneurs from the national 
economy, leading to what Oldham described as the 'survival of 
the unfittest' (1914, p. 213). Had these people chosen to stay at 
home rather than emigrate, this, Mjoset believes, would have 
created social tensions and frictions which would have acted as 
a positive force for social and economic dynamism. However, they 
opted instead to leave, thereby facilitating the emergence of 
dominant social forces and institutions opposed to change, and 
dependent on the maintenance of emigration for their continued 
prosperity and domination. As a result, Ireland lacks a 'national 
system of innovation' such as is found in all countries characterised 
by autocentric development. In effect, Ireland has failed to 
engender a national institutional framework which encourages 
and facilitates the adoption of new ways of doing things. 
VIcious Circles of Underdevelopment 
Mjoset therefore sees in deindustrialisation, marginalisation and 
emigration the creation of a vicious circle of continued under-
development- Myrdal's cumulative causation process working 
in reverse. Thus, emigration restricted the growth of the home 
market (and hence the impetus for import substitution), allowed 
the emergence of a pastoral bias in agriculture, with a limited 
capacity for backward linkages, and fostered social structures in 
the countryside inimical to social progress. These forces have 
produced a weak national system of innovation, leading to a lack 
of economic growth, limited employment opportunities, social 
marginalisation and further emigration, thereby completing the 
circle. As Mjoset sees it, this vicious circle created an institutional 
framework which was, if anything, strengthened by the transition 
to political independence by what was to become the Republic 
of Ireland. This is reflected in the emergence in the post-colonial 
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period of subsidiary economic and socio-political vicious circles 
from the initial vicious circle which became established in the 
colonial period. In the economic sphere, the social structure 
emanating from the latter period produced a political system 
which gave primacy to the agrarian interest, leading to the 
maintenance of the emphasis on cattle exports and a continued 
dependence on the British market. This lack of diversification has 
led to the continuation of a weak national system of innovation, 
which in turn has failed to halt emigration and has preserved an 
entrenched agrarian-dominated social structure. 
In the socio-political sphere, the loss of potentially radical 
elements via emigration led to the emergence of two 'catch-all' 
political parties unable to challenge the dominant elements in 
the conservative social structure and unable to articulate the 
voice of the marglnalised. This again confirms the weakness of 
the national system of innovation and the continuation of 
emigration, thus maintaining the circle. Several of the key elements 
of the institutional structures embedded in Mjoset's vicious circles 
have declined greatly in influence in the last thirty years. These 
include the dependence on cattle and beef exports, the dominance 
of the Catholic Church and the agrarian orientation of the political 
system. However, for both politicians and the state bureaucracy, 
innovation remains anathema. The education system continues 
to inculcate deeply conservative views, particularly among the intel-
ligentsia, and the indigenous business community remains imbued 
with a 'quick-buck' mentality which is a direct throw-back to the 
circumstances pertaining in the nineteenth-century agrarian 
economy. 
New institutions have emerged, however, to counter potential 
tendencies in the direction of radical innovation. These include 
the penetration of foreign·media which continually convey con-
servative ideologies, growing dependence of the indigenous 
business community on the foreigo-owned industrial sector, and 
EU subsidies which have played an important role in helping the 
Irish government to cope with rapidly growing unemployment 
since the early 1980s. 
What are the Real Alternatives? 
Having indicated where Ireland went wrong,Mjoset provides no 
guidelines on how Ireland might break out of these vicious circles. 
While he cites, apparently approvingly, Gerschenkron's (1962) 
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view that intervention on the part of the state (or the banking 
system) is a sine qua non for effective economic development in 
late-developing economies, the problem for Ireland is where the 
impetus for such intervention might come, given the innately con-
servative nature both of government itself (referring both to the 
dominant political parties and the state bureaucracy) and of those 
groups which exert effective political influence on government. 
Furthermore there have been very few peripheral countries 
which have managed to make the transition to autocentric 
development. The obvious exceptions have been the newly indus-
trialising countries (NICs) of East Asia (Korea, Taiwan and Hong 
Kong). The recent economic histories of these three countries have 
been fundamentally different from other so-called NICs (such as 
Singapore, Brazil and Mexico) in that they have succeeded in 
creating dominant indigenous industrial sectors with strong local 
linkages. Henderson (1990) attributes this to the fact that all 
three possessed governments faced with legitimation crises in the 
1950s due either to the threat of rapidly developing neighbours 
with territorial designs (North Korea and China) or the complete 
absence of democratic representative government (Hong Kong). 
These threats, according to Henderson, were sufficiently strong 
to spur the governments in question to undertake the kinds of 
radical action required to create autocentric economic structures 
capable of raising living standards considerably throughout the 
. population. In this, South Korea and Taiwan in particular had the 
neighbouring model of Japan to draw on. They also, it might be 
added, lacked the democratic structures which might have stymied 
the severe measures employed, particularly in the early stages of 
industrialisation. This is especially the case in relation to wage 
suppression and poor working conditions, both of which were 
needed in order to attract foreign technology and gain footholds 
in export markets. 
In the case of Ireland, it could be argued that there was one 
instance of a legitimation crisis in the 1950s, when mass emigration 
seriously threatened the continued viability of the state. This did 
produce a radical response witnessed by the abandonment of de 
Valera's policy of economic autarky and protectionism. However, 
whereas the alternative policy of attracting foreign investment 
may appear at first glance to have been similar to contempora-
neous policies being pursued in the East Asian 'tigers', in the case 
of the latter this was part of a long-term policy designed to create 
a self-reliant technological capacity, whereas in the case of Ireland 
foreign investment constituted an end in itself. For more than 
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twenty years foreign investment did manage to keep the economic 
and political wolf from the Irish government's door. However, 
foreign investment is no longer delivering the goods, and there 
is little indication that anybody with political influence in Ireland 
has a clear notion of where to go from here. This is evident from 
the public reaction to the Culliton Report on industrial policy 
(Industrial Policy Review Group, 1992). From the viewpoint of 
this chapter, by far the most important recommendation 
emanating from this report was the proposal that industrial 
promotion policy should be oriented towards the fostering of 
clusters of interlinked industries. This, as we have seen, is an 
essential ingredient of autocentric development. However, this 
rather complex dimension was virtually ignored in subsequent 
political, media and academic comment on the report, which 
focused instead on the politically juicy elements such as tax 
reform and the restructuring of state agencies. 
Conclusion 
One is, therefore, less than sanguine about the prospects of Ireland 
escaping from its condition of economic peripherality in the 
foreseeable future. The institutional forces opposed to the requisite 
change are simply too strong and entrenched. The only conceivable 
source of political pressure for radical change is the high, and 
growing, levels of unemployment and low-paid employment. 
There are signs that these are finally forcing job creation to the 
top of the government's agenda. However, there is no indication 
as of yet of the formation of a coherent political movement 
around this issue. One suspects that a lot depends on the ability 
of the EU heartland to provide subsidies sufficient to keep such 
potential mobilisation under wraps. The latest round of enlarged 
EU Structural Funds, therefore, may have the effect of putting the 
day of reckoning back at least until the beginning of the coming 
century. 
Note 
1. In the remainder of the chapter, the terms 'Irish' and 'Ireland' 
refer to the Republic of Ireland only. 
